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Evidence of State-Level Variability in the Economic and 
Demographic Well-Being of People with Disabilities in India
* 
 
Among countries with comparable levels of income, India has one of the more progressive 
disability policy frameworks; however, people with disabilities in India are subject to multiple 
disadvantages. This paper focuses on state-level variations in outcomes for people with 
disabilities to provide one explanation for the stark contrast between the liberal laws on paper 
and the challenges faced by people with disabilities in practice. Using a random coefficients 
model that allows for state-level differences, we find that households with members with 
disabilities have 4.2 percent lower marriage rates, monthly per capita expenditure that is 
lower by 176 Indian Rupees (19 percent of overall average per capita expenditure), and 
about a 5 percent lower level of completed formal schooling as compared to households 
without disabled individuals. Tests of parameter constancy across states are almost uniformly 
rejected indicating the presence of substantial state-level heterogeneity across all models in 
the outcomes examined. 
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I: Introduction 
  Despite differing estimates, empirical evidence as of 2007 suggests that between 4 to 8 
percent of the population in India is comprised of people with disabilities (World Bank, 2007), 
which translates into 40-90 million people, a substantial number. People with disabilities in India 
are subject to multiple deprivations and limited opportunities in several dimensions of their lives. 
Households with people with disabilities are 25 percent less likely to report having 3 meals per 
day year around, more likely to have members who are illiterate and children who are not 
enrolled in school, have much lower employment rates, and have limited awareness of 
entitlements and services available by law for people with disabilities (World Bank, 2007). 
Hence, these households are likely to be over-represented among the poor and socially 
marginalized. 
  The experiences of people with disabilities are in stark contrast to the fact that certain 
departments in India such as the education sector have been viewed as progressive in their 
delivery of options to children with distinctive needs (World Bank, 2007).  Disability statistics 
were collected in the Census of India from as early as the late nineteenth century, and the country 
had special schools that catered to the needs of people with disabilities from about the same time 
period. However, integration of people with disabilities, and policy commitment to their 
participation as equals in society occurred only thirty years ago with the passage of four 
important laws. These included the Mental Health Act, 1987; the People with Disabilities (Equal 
Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (PWD Act); the 
Rehabilitation Council of India Act, 1992, and the National Trust for Welfare of Persons with 
Autism, Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation and Multiple Disabilities Act, 1999 (World Bank, 
2007). India also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2007. 2 
 
The PWD Act of 1995 was the key central legislation that provided certain entitlements in the 
areas of education, employment, and affirmative action, and other privileges in prevention and 
early detection of disabilities.  The PWD Act of 1995 also provided for non-discrimination in 
access to public modes of transportation such as railways and buses by requiring that these 
vehicles be modified in ways to make them accessible to people in wheelchairs, and called for 
the installation of ramps in government buildings and public primary health centers as well as the 
provision of braille signs and auditory signals at traffic lights and intersections.  Under the PWD 
Act, the establishment of these entitlements to persons with disabilities was conditional on being 
“within (the government’s) limits of economic capacity and development” (World Bank, 2007).  
  How does one reconcile the vulnerabilities of Indians with disabilities in practice with the 
relatively advanced set of laws (among other countries with comparable levels of income) on 
paper? This is an important question since widespread hardship among people with disabilities 
persists in India, despite the extant legislation. Under the Constitution of India, obligations to 
people with disabilities fall under the jurisdiction of state governments and the State List under 
“Relief of people with disabilities and unemployable” (World Bank, 2007).
1  Hence, state 
governments in India are primarily responsible for implementing laws and distributing social 
welfare benefits to people with disabilities. States also have considerable leeway in 
independently deciding priorities among issues related to disability, and in creating legislation 
suited to the context of their environment’s socio-cultural background (Bagchi, 2003, Sinha, 
2004). By comparing outcomes for people with disabilities using a methodology that allows 
separate paths for each state, this study shows that there is considerable variation across sub-
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legislate on independent of the central government.  “Relief of people with disabilities and 
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national entities in the provision of services to people with disabilities in India. Thus while a 
comprehensive set of commitments to people with disabilities exist by law in India, some states 
have been more effective than others in the delivery of their obligations. 
  Evidence of considerable variability at the state-level in providing for people with 
disabilities is evident when one notes that some states have been pro-active in increasing 
awareness among people with disabilities about commitments and entitlements (Tamil Nadu, 
Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, and New Delhi) whereas others have lagged in implementing many of 
the basic entitlements enshrined in the PWD Act of 1995 (Bihar, Maharashtra, Orissa, Uttar 
Pradesh).  In fact in Uttar Pradesh which is the most populous state in India, 80 percent of 
households with people with disabilities were unaware of the process of certification as a person 
with disability (World Bank, 2007).  Further, there appears to be little correlation between the 
economic resources of a state or its institutional capacity and provision of services to persons 
with impairments.  For example Chhattisgarh, a relatively new but poor state, has a well-thought 
out state-level disability policy that is often touted within India as a “best practice framework” 
and model for other states.  Alternatively Gujarat, a more established state with higher wealth 
has demonstrated little commitment in implementing a key requirement of the PWD Act of 1995 
(has had only one meeting to facilitate center-state coordination in distribution of benefits as of 
2003) (World Bank, 2007).
2   
  This study examines household-level indicators on education, monthly per capita 
expenditure, marriage, loss of work due to disability, receipt of government and non-government 
aid, measures of pre-school intervention, and enrollment in special schools for children with 
disabilities. The aim is to understand how these outcomes differ between households with and 
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without members with disabilities. Among households with member(s) with disabilities, this 
study investigates how these outcomes vary by gender and the number of people with 
disabilities. The empirical analysis is implemented in a manner that allows sub-national entities 
(states and union territories) to exhibit different trends in the cross-section. Thus the household 
comparisons executed are conditional on state-specific variations in the recognition of challenges 
faced by people with disabilities in India, and state-wise differences in delivery of services to this 
population.  
Results from the state-level random coefficient regression models show that in a 
comparison of households with no people with disabilities, households with members with 
disabilities have monthly per capita expenditure that is lower by about Rupees 176 (about 19 
percent of overall average per capita expenditures or about 4 US 2002 dollars), marriage rates 
that are lower by about 4 percent, illiteracy rates that are higher by about 0.5 percent, and rates of 
completion of secondary school and above that are lower by about 5 percent.  As compared to 
the reference group of households with no persons with disabilities, households with female 
disabled member(s) have per capita expenditures that are lower by approximately Rupees 158.  
However, in comparison to households with no persons with disabilities, households with male 
disabled member(s) have per capita expenses that are lower by about Rupees 190.  This leads to 
the striking observation that households with female disabled member(s) have expenditures that 
are approximately Rupees 33 higher (4 percent of average monthly per capita expenditure in 
households with people with disabilities or about 1 US 2002 dollar) as compared to a household 
with male disabled member(s). Households with disabled female(s) are also significantly less 
likely to receive non-government aid as compared to households with disabled male(s), 
highlighting the special vulnerability of households with female persons with disabilities. 5 
 
Finally, households with multiple members with disabilities do not appear to fare differently as 
compare to households with a single person with disability – there is no statistically discernible 
difference between these two types of households in outcomes related to marriage, monthly 
expenditure, education, or receipt of aid.  
Across all models discussed above, tests of parameter constancy reject the null 
hypothesis that state-level coefficients are the same. That is, there is evidence of significant state-
level heterogeneity in the outcomes examined among people with disabilities in India. 
Alternative techniques including instrumental variables and Wald estimator tests are used to 
demonstrate the robustness of the main random-coefficient estimates. These results underline the 
importance of having strong, accountable sub-national institutions that are committed to 
implementing the provisions of key legislations for people with disabilities in India.  
II: Background on Disability Research in India 
  Although past work has noted the important but incomplete role played by the state in 
delivery of services and entitlements (Thomas, 2005, World Bank, 2007), there is little empirical 
work on state-level variations in indicators of economic and demographic well-being among 
people with disabilities in India. Not surprisingly, disability research in general has tended to 
focus on the link between disability and poverty (Trani and Loeb, 2010, Braithwaite and Mont, 
2009, Hoogeveen, 2005, Yeo and Moore, 2003). This is especially so for India. Thomas (2005) 
argues that poverty is one of the biggest causes and consequences of disability in India. People 
with disabilities in India are among the poorest of the poor, often live in rural areas, often are 
disabled at birth or before school age, are poorly educated, widely unemployed, and especially 
vulnerable to exploitation and abuse (particularly women). Using 2006 data from Vietnam, 
another developing country, Mont and Cuong (2011) show the strong inter-linkage between 6 
 
disability and poverty, particularly when the additional cost of living with disabilities is taken 
into account. This is especially true in rural areas and in households with children with 
disabilities (Mont and Cuong, 2011). Filmer (2008) argues that among school-age children (6-17 
years) across 13 developing countries, disability-based school participation deficits are often 
larger than those associated with characteristics such as gender, residence in rural areas, or the 
household’s economic standing. Furthermore, Cuong and Mont (2011) notes that in families 
where a parent is disabled, non-disabled children tend to have lower primary and secondary 
school participation rates. Part of this is attributed to the fact that in such households, child’s 
time substitutes for parental time in income generation and household production. Among 
children with disabilities in India, girls tend to receive less care than boys and are more likely to 
die as a consequence (Thomas, 2005). Among children with disabilities, girls also tend to receive 
less education than boys.  
In an attempt to improve the educational outcomes of children with disabilities, the 
government of India has emphasized the development of “special schools” and alternative 
systems such as informal education centers. However, education experts have criticized the 
widespread development of such schools and systems as the quality of education offered at these 
institutions is sub-par, and because attendance at these facilities perpetuates inequalities between 
children with disabilities and others (Singal, 2006a, Singal 2006b). Moreover, the gender gap in 
schooling measures remains evident in these institutions as they make little attempt to encourage 
the schooling of girls with disabilities (Kalyanpur, 2008).    
The particular susceptibility of girls with disabilities resonates with other findings for 
women with disabilities in India. Mehrotra (2004) argues that women with disabilities in India 
face double discrimination due to the prevalence of traditional gender roles and expectations. 7 
 
Women with disabilities in rural India are more likely to be divorced, abandoned, married off to 
the “wrong” person, subject to misconceptions that their disability may be inherited by their 
children, and often treated as “incomplete” mothers and housewives (Mehrotra, 2004).  Among 
older adults, there is empirical evidence that women are more likely to hide physical 
impairments if their spouse is still alive (older married women are less likely to report 
disabilities), and because of cultural differences, older women in northern India appear to be 
more disadvantaged as compared to their counterparts in southern India (Sengupta and Agree, 
2002). Furthermore, rural women with disabilities are the most likely to be disregarded by survey 
enumerators (Jeffrey and Singhal, 2008). Echoing the need to think of poverty and disability as 
interlinked, Mehrotra (2004) argues that the availability of resources (that varies along caste, 
class, and gender lines) has a strong impact on the management of disability. 
  One reason for the inter-linkage between disability and poverty is the fact that people 
with disabilities have significantly lower employment rates than average, even though the large 
majority of this population is capable of working. Using a cross-sectional data set from the state 
of Tamil Nadu, Mitra and Sambamoorthi (2008) shows that gaps in employment between 
disabled and non-disabled males cannot be explained by differences in education, health, or 
productivity. This conclusion is reached since a selectivity-corrected wage equation indicates 
that wages are not statistically different between disabled and non-disabled males. Alternatively, 
the lower employment probability of people with disabilities is attributed to differential returns 
to characteristics and from discrimination in employment opportunities. 
  Other studies that have found little effect of remedial policies on the employment 
outcomes of people with disabilities in India include Thompkins (2010). For example, in a study 
of the Indira Kranthi Program which facilitates micro-lending through self-help groups to people 8 
 
with disabilities in rural Andhra Pradesh, although the program resulted in increased borrowing, 
education, and asset ownership, there was negative to zero effects on the labor market 
participation of the beneficiaries (Thompkins, 2010). The presence of members with disabilities 
in a household also has important implications for the labor supply of other household members. 
Estimates from Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu show that about 45 percent of households with 
people with special needs report another adult being absent from work to provide care for the 
person with disability (World Bank, 2007). 
  Complicating the assessment of the security of people with disabilities in India is the 
relative dearth of nationally representative surveys with detailed data on this population. As of 
the last decade, there are only two such surveys – the National Sample Survey (NSS) of 2002 
and the Census of 2001. Both sources have different definitions for the major types of 
impairments; the NSS is judged to be better than the Census in terms of hearing, speech, and 
locomotive impairments (Jeffrey and Singal, 2008). In terms of visual impairments, the NSS 
2002 survey disregarded people wearing spectacles and contact lenses but the Census did not.  
  Relying on the relative strengths of the NSS versus the Census, this study uses the 
nationally representative information in the former (we will have a conservative bias in our 
assessment of the visually impaired) to contribute to research on disability in India in two ways. 
First, we offer one route to reconcile the contrast in the relatively enlightened nature of India’s 
disability policies (for a developing country) with the challenges faced by people with 
disabilities in every-day life by focusing on state-level heterogeneity in distribution of 
commitments to the disabled. This is accomplished by using an empirical method that allows for 
state-level differences among the outcomes analyzed, and to the best of our knowledge, is the 
first study to explicitly model state-level variation in outcomes of people with disabilities in 9 
 
India. Second, within this state-specific structural framework, we consider differences in results 
by gender of the person with disabilities, and by indicators of whether the household has a single 
member or multiple members with impairments. Although it is qualitatively recognized that in 
the population of people with disabilities, households with female members with disabilities and 
those with multiple people with disabilities may be most vulnerable, this study breaks new 
ground by quantitatively assessing how large the differentials actually are for these sub-sets of 
people with disabilities. 
III: Empirical Methodology 
  To allow for state-level variations in a comparison of households with and without 
disabled members, we employ a state-specific random-coefficients linear regression model based 
on Swamy (1970). Consider the following: 
       
         
Where           denotes a state, and    is the (      ) coefficient vector for the  
th state.
3    is 
a         matrix of control variables with            Treating parameter heterogeneity as 
stochastic implies that  
            
With  (  )     and  (    
 )    . Swamy (1970) provides a solution to finding   ̂ and   ̂ by 
noting that the resulting generalized least squares (GLS) estimator from stacking the   equations 
is a weighted-average of the within-panel ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators.
4 The required 
parameters are estimated using a two-step approach (where the procedure begins by estimating 
   with OLS) outlined in Swamy (1970). Results of these random coefficients linear regression 
models with conditioning at the state level are reported in Tables 4-8. 
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  Further, Swamy (1970) provides a test of the null hypothesis of parameter constancy 
between the OLS estimate of   (disregarding the panel structure) and the weighted average of 
the within-panel OLS estimators. This is a test of whether the panel structure of the data has 
important implications for results, or whether statistically equivalent estimates may be obtained 
by pooling the models and ignoring cross-panel variations. Johnston and DiNardo (1997) shows 
that the test in Swamy (1970) is essentially the same as a test of the null hypothesis that the 
estimated coefficients are equal in a generalized group-wise heteroskedastic least squares model. 
Results of these tests, which provide statistical evidence for state-level heterogeneity, are also 
reported in Tables 4-8. 
  Finally, although we are cognizant of state-wise deviations, the outcomes and control 
variables in this study are measured at the household level. This is because we wish to 
implement a comparison of differences among households with and without disabled members, 
conditional on state-level heterogeneity. With household level observations, we have multiple 
households per state, a data set-up that leads to correlations among standard errors at the state 
level. In order to appropriately account for such correlations, the results tables report 
bootstrapped standard errors that are clustered at the state level.  
IV: Description of Data 
  Data used in this analysis are constructed by combining the dedicated disability module 
and the consumer expenditure module of the NSS 2002. The disability module surveys only 
those households that have disabled member(s). Hence, these data alone do not allow a 
comparison of outcomes with households that have no disabled individuals. In order to create the 
appropriate data set that facilitates such a comparison, households in the disability module are 
merged with households in the consumer expenditure module that was fielded in the same year. 11 
 
The data set has information on 32,669 households of which 15,201 households (46.53 percent) 
have one or more disabled members. 9,243 households (34.60 percent) have disabled male 
member(s), 6,763 households (27.91 percent) have disabled female(s), and 1,180 households 
(7.76 percent) have both disabled male and disabled female member(s). For purposes of the 
analysis, children with disabilities are considered in conjunction with adults with disabilities 
(however, two outcomes pertaining to pre-school interventions and enrollment in special schools 
are measured only for children with disabilities between 5-18 years of age). Households are the 
basis of analyses, thus individual level outcomes are aggregated to the household level in the 
structural estimations that follow.
5 Nationally representative estimates are obtained by using 
weights provided by the NSS. 
  The NSS has details on five different types of impairments – mental, visual, hearing, 
speech, and locomotive. Among the disabled, the most common impairment is that associated 
with hearing (25.56 percent), followed by mental (24.47 percent) and visual (20.73 percent). 
Less than one percent of the sample (0.34 percent) reports multiple impairments. For purposes of 
this study, the different types of disabilities are analyzed together since we do not possess 
detailed data to model state-level differences in provision of services by disability type.  
Approximately 43 percent report being disabled from birth and about 60 percent of households 
with members with disabilities reside in rural India. 
  Figure 1 reports the state-wise percent of households with disabled member(s) where the 
comparison group is households with no person(s) with disabilities. The highest proportion of 
such households is present in the states of Kerala, Nagaland, and Orissa. Among union territories 
in India (these are directly under central government jurisdiction), almost 60 percent of 
                                                 
5 Discrete outcomes at the individual level are thus averaged to their household means.  This is 
the sample that is used in all models of this research. 12 
 
households in Lakshadweep have disabled member(s). This study does not exclude union 
territories from the analysis since five of seven such territories have between 30-50 percent of 
households with members with disabilities (Daman and Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, 
Lakshadweep, Pondicherry, and Andaman & Nicobar). We would be disregarding a sizeable 
proportion of people with disabilities in India if these areas were excluded. 
  Figure 2 is a state-wise disaggregation of households with disabled male member(s), 
disabled female member(s), or more than one disabled member.  The comparison group for 
disabled male member(s) is households with no person(s) with disabilities; similarly for disabled 
female member(s).  The comparison group for households with more than one disabled member 
is households with only one disabled member.  Except for the state of Mizoram in northeastern 
India, the proportion of households with disabled male members exceeds the proportion of 
households with disabled female members across all states. Some part of this may be explained 
by the fact that women are less likely to report being disabled, or, as noted above, be overlooked 
by enumerators especially in rural areas. The highest proportion of households with multiple 
members with disabilities is present in the states of Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and 
Maharashtra, and the union territories of New Delhi, Lakshadweep, and Andaman and Nicobar. 
  Figures 3 and 4 paint a picture of average household economic resources and receipt of 
government aid among household with and without disabled individuals, respectively. As 
expected, Figure 3 shows that in general average monthly per capita expenditure is higher in 
households without disabled members. The sole exception is the union territory of Chandigarh, 
where monthly expenditure in households with people with disabilities is almost 400 Rupees 
(about 8 US 2002 dollars) higher than in households without disabled members. A possible 
explanation for this is provided in Figure 4 which reports that Chandigarh has one of the largest 13 
 
proportions of government aid (for education, vocational training, to purchase aid/appliance, for 
corrective surgery, or aid in the form of a government/semi-government job) received by 
households with disabled members. Households with people with disabilities also receive a 
significant proportion of government aid in Pondicherry, Andaman and Nicobar, and Karnataka. 
The estimate for Karnataka is interesting since it is in keeping with anecdotal evidence presented 
in World Bank (2007) of being one of the more advanced states in India in terms of political 
commitments and delivered outcomes to persons with disabilities. 
  State-wise disaggregated household means of outcomes, household characteristics, and 
characteristics of people with disabilities are reported in Tables 1-3. Table 1 shows that 
household averages of marriage rates vary between 38 to 51 percent across Indian states, and 
monthly per capita expenditure is lowest in Bihar and Orissa. Dadra and Nagar Haveli has the 
highest proportion reporting loss of work due to disability whereas Sikkim has the lowest 
proportion. States are more likely to have illiterate residents or residents with only middle school 
as compared to completing secondary school and above, and the highest proportions of disabled 
persons completing a vocational course are found in Andaman and Nicobar, Himachal Pradesh, 
and Kerala. Receipt of non-government aid (any aid/help other than from the government) is 
essentially zero across most states. In terms of children with disabilities, the highest proportions 
of such children attending pre-school interventions are found in Goa, Chandigarh and Gujarat. 
Among states, Maharashtra and Goa have the highest proportion of such children enrolled in 
special schools. 
  State-wise means of household characteristics including rates of self-employment, 
religion, age, and gender and literacy of the household head are reported in Table 2. Rates of 
self-employment are uniformly high across most areas of India, and wage/salary earnings are 14 
 
especially low in northeastern states with large rural populations such as Sikkim, Arunachal 
Pradesh, and Assam. Hinduism is the dominant household religion in several large states (Uttar 
Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu), and the northeast states 
of Nagaland and Mizoram in particular have very high proportions of households belonging to 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (lower caste denominations in India). Most households 
in India have male heads, and the highest proportion of illiterate heads is found in the southern 
state of Andhra Pradesh. Finally, many households across India live in independent houses; 
however, the houses themselves are often not made of stable materials such as concrete (unstable 
structures). 
  Table 3 presents means of the characteristics of disabled individuals. Several of these 
estimates have been discussed above and presented in Figures 1-2. In terms of those reporting 
being disabled from birth, the highest proportions are found in Chandigarh, New Delhi, Sikkim, 
and Lakshadweep. For age of onset of disability for those who were not born with impairments, 
the lowest ages are reported in Chandigarh, New Delhi, Nagaland, and Jharkhand.  
V: Results  
  Results from the state-level random coefficients linear regression models are reported in 
Tables 4-8. Table 4 shows a comparison of demographic and economic outcomes between 
households that have disabled member(s) and households that have no individuals with 
disabilities. Overall, the results are as hypothesized. Households with members with disabilities 
have a 4.2 percent lower probability of marriage, Rupees 176 lower monthly per capita 
expenditure, a marginally higher rate of illiteracy, and an approximately 5 percent lower 
probability of being educated up to the secondary school level and above. Households with 15 
 
people with disabilities are also significantly less likely to have members who have completed 
diploma or certificate courses.  
  The unexpected result in Table 4 is the significant positive coefficient on middle school 
which indicates that in comparison to households with no disabled members, those with people 
with disabilities are more likely to have individuals who have completed middle school. The 
middle school variable is an indicator for all who have completed up to middle school and thus 
includes individuals with primary schooling as well. Thus, the variable may reflect the fact that 
primary schooling in India is relatively widespread.  
  Table 4 also reports tests of parameter constancy - a test for equivalence in coefficient 
estimates across states. The p-values for all outcomes indicate that the null hypothesis can be 
rejected, that is, there is statistically discernible variation in parameters across states. This 
rejection indicates the presence of substantial state-level heterogeneity in the six outcomes 
analyzed. Hence, states in India differ considerably when gauged on the basis of the outcomes in 
Table 4. As noted above, the standard errors in Table 4 are clustered to adjust for non-
independence at the state level.  
  Table 5 reports results for a comparison of household with disabled male(s) and 
households without any people with disabilities. Overall, the trends seen in outcomes in Table 4 
are reflected here. Furthermore, chi-squared tests of parameter constancy continue to reject the 
null hypothesis that there is no state-level heterogeneity across all outcomes considered. Table 6 
is a mirror of the model in Table 5 as it looks at the relative deprivation of households with 
disabled female(s) versus households that have no members with disabilities. Again, the pattern 
evident in Tables 4 and 5 resonates here and there is continuing statistical evidence that state-
level variation is substantial. A comparison of effects in Tables 5 and 6 leads to an interesting 16 
 
observation – in relation to households that have no disabled members, those with disabled 
female(s) have slightly higher levels of monthly per capita expenditure (of about Rupees 33, 
which is 4.4% of the average monthly per capita expenditure in households with disabled 
members) as compared to households with disabled male(s). This is despite the fact that 
households with female members with disabilities are significantly more likely to be illiterate as 
compared to households with no people with disabilities, whereas households with male 
members with disabilities show no differential in this outcome relative to the comparison group. 
The higher level of expenditure in households with disabled women is consistent with qualitative 
evidence in Thomas (2005) which notes that where men and women have similar levels of 
impairments, women are likely to continue to work.  
  The remaining results pertain to estimates from a comparison of households with 
individuals with disabilities of different genders, and households with multiple individuals with 
disabilities versus households with only one disabled member. Table 7 presents a comparison of 
households with only disabled female(s) versus households with only disabled male(s). Results 
show that households with disabled females have significantly lower marriage rates, higher 
monthly per capita expenditure (noted above), and are also about 4 percent more likely to report 
that disability caused loss of work. In comparison to households with disable male(s), 
households with women with disabilities are more likely to be illiterate and less likely to have 
completed middle school. There are no significant differences in receipt of government aid, but 
notably, households with disabled females are about 0.3 percent less likely to receive aid from 
non-government sources. Although the magnitude of this coefficient is not substantial, this result 
underscores the particular susceptibilities of this group of households and points to the possibly 
high marginal returns that may accrue from expansion of non-government sources of credit, such 17 
 
as micro-finance, to this population of individuals with disabilities in India. Tests of state-level 
parameter constancy fail to reject in 3 of the 12 outcomes considered – person with disabilities 
completed vocational course, person with disabilities received non-government aid, and child 
with disabilities enrolled in a special school, indicating that for these outcomes there is little 
statistical evidence of state-level differences. 
  Finally, Table 8 presents a comparison of households with more than one disabled 
member versus households with only one disabled member. The intent of this model is to judge 
whether having multiple members with impairments poses significantly different burdens on 
households as compared to having just one person with disabilities in the home. In short, there is 
no evidence for differing relative economic well-being from the estimates in Table 8 as the 
indicator for households with multiple members with disabilities is insignificant across most 
outcomes analyzed. Furthermore, tests of state-level parameter constancy fail to reject in two 
cases – completion of vocational course and receipt of non-government aid – indicating that for 
these outcomes there is no statistically perceptible state-level heterogeneity.  
VI: Further Evidence for Results 
  A question that requires attention is whether the indicator for disability is exogenous. 
That is, is the indicator variable for households with members with disabilities influenced by 
measurement error or correlation with omitted variables? Measurement error might result if there 
is under-reporting of disability as might happen in the case of women with impairments in rural 
areas. However, note that such under-reporting leads to a conservative bias in our estimates. That 
is, with the inclusion of such members in our sample, our results should only increase in 
magnitude and possibly, in significance. Hence, correcting for under-reporting by including more 
(representative) individuals with disabilities is not likely to undermine the results of this study. 18 
 
  Endogeneity in the indicator of households with members with disabilities might also 
result due to correlation with omitted variables. Hence for example, if women with poor nutrition 
are more likely to bear children with impairments and also more likely to live in resource-
constrained households, then not controlling for health investments in mothers may lead to 
spurious correlations between disability indicators and average household expenditure. There 
might be similar artificial correlations created between the disability indicators and the 
probability of marriage in the household. We address this issue by instrumenting for disability 
and then re-estimating the models in Table 4 to demonstrate that our results remain unaltered.
6 
  The instruments that we use for disabled status are whether parents of people with 
disabilities were blood related, and whether an individual with disabilities can take care of him or 
herself. These variables are clearly correlated to disability, but conditional on disability, are 
unlikely to have independent effects on the household outcomes considered in Table 4. Results 
of the instrumental variable regressions are reported in Table 9. A comparison of parameters in 
this table with those in Table 4 for corresponding outcomes shows that the instrumental variable 
(IV) estimates are quite close to the random-coefficients estimates. For example, the IV results 
indicate that in households with disabled members, average monthly per capita expenditure is 
lower by about Rupees 227. The corresponding coefficient in Table 4 is Rupees 176. Except for 
illiteracy (where we lose significance), the parameters for other outcomes are even closer across 
Tables 4 and 9. 
                                                 
6 We demonstrate the robustness of only the indicator for households with members with 
disabilities in Table 4 since this encompasses households with disabled male(s), households with 
disabled female(s), and households with more than one disabled member.  Furthermore, since it 
is not clear how standard errors are to be adjusted for presence of predicted variables in random-
coefficients linear regression models, we estimate two-stage least squares models with region 
fixed effects (each region is a conglomeration of states) to implement a method that is broadly 
structurally equivalent.  Two-stage least squares models have the added advantage of reporting 
tests of instrument validity.  19 
 
  The substance of the results in Table 9 rests on the validity of the instruments. In this 
regard tests of under-identification (Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic) and over-identification 
(Hansen’s J statistic) are reported in the table. These tests provide evidence that the instruments 
have sufficient power (the p-values associated with the Kleibergen–Paap statistic uniformly 
reject the null that the model is under-identified), and are valid (the p-values associated with 
Hansen’s J statistic uniformly indicate that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the instruments 
are uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the estimation equation). Taken 
together, the evidence in Table 9 indicates that the disability indicator is treated correctly and the 
random-coefficient results in Tables 4-8 are robust. 
  We implement another check on the integrity of the IV results by constructing their Wald 
estimator equivalent. This is accomplished by using a discrete version of the variable which 
indicates whether the parents of people with disabilities are blood-related as the (only) 
identifying instrument and then following Angrist (1991) and Angrist and Pischke (2009) to 
construct the IV estimate as the difference in the reduced-form means divided by the difference 
in the first-stage means.
7 Table 10 reports the Wald estimator results for the household outcomes 
considered in Table 4. A quick comparison reveals that the estimates in Table 10 are very close 
to those in Table 4, indeed, even closer than the IV estimates in Table 9. 
  The substance of the Wald estimator results in Table 10 rests on the validity of the claim 
that the only reason why the expected value of household outcomes (such as average 
expenditure) conditional on the identifying instrument changes as the instrument changes is 
                                                 
7 We constructed an alternate version of the Wald estimator by reducing the data to district means 
following the argument made in Moffitt (1996).  These results are not reported in the paper but 
are broadly consistent with the main results in Table 4 and the IV results in Table 9.  We lose 
some precision in estimates because of the reduced number of observations when the data are 
reduced to district means. 20 
 
variation in the expected value of disability status conditional on the instrument. One way to 
justify this claim is to demonstrate the absence of an association between the instrument and 
personal characteristics such as caste or gender which are, in some sense, not determined 
concurrently with disability status (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
8 These tests are presented in 
Table 11. The estimates in Table 11 show that conditional on household characteristics, the 
identifying instrument is not significantly correlated to whether the household’s religion is 
Hinduism, whether the household belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe 
denominations, whether the household belongs to Other Backward Classes, or whether the 
gender is male. Results in Tables 9-11 provide evidence in favor of the assertion that the 
disability indicator is treated correctly in the random coefficient results of Tables 4-8. 
VII: Conclusion and Policy Implications 
  Outcomes for people with disabilities in India are inconsistent with the aims of its 
disability legislation, or its ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. By using a random-coefficients regression model that allows for differing state-level 
paths, this study provides evidence of state-level disparities in the economic well-being of people 
with disabilities in India. Since under the Constitution of India, primary responsibility for 
delivery of services and commitments to people with impairments rests at the state level, 
focusing on this sub-national entity enables a clearer understanding of where implementation is 
weak. In terms of most demographic and economic measures of well-being analyzed in this 
paper, households with members with disabilities fare significantly worse as compared to 
households without people with disabilities. In particular, households with individuals with 
                                                 
8 Another way of thinking about this is that we want to demonstrate a lack of correlation between 
the instrument and other omitted variables that might influence household outcomes such as 
average expenditure and education levels.   21 
 
disabilities have 4.2 percent lower marriage rates, Rupees 176 lower monthly per capita 
expenditures (about 4 US 2002 dollars), higher rates of illiteracy, and about 5 percent lower 
levels of secondary schooling and above. Similar trends hold when the analysis is disaggregated 
by gender of the individual with disabilities, where households with female disabled members 
are found to be particularly vulnerable. Finally, in general, households with multiple individuals 
with disabilities are not found to fare much worse in terms of the outcomes examined as 
compared to households with one disabled member. The robustness of these results is established 
using two alternate methods (instrumental variables and the Wald estimator) that check for 
possible endogeneity in the measure of household-level disability that is used in this study. Tests 
for parameter constancy across states are almost uniformly rejected, indicating the presence of 
substantial state-level heterogeneity across all models in the outcomes examined. 
  These results imply that an important way to improve the economic well-being of people 
with disabilities in India may rest on improving services at the state-level. In particular, a fruitful 
route might be to extend government aid to this population, particularly households with disabled 
women. In the same vein, since households with disabled women are found to receive less non-
government aid as compared to households with disabled men, facilitating access to this source 
of credit, such as that from micro-finance, may be especially beneficial. A more pro-active state-
government role in furthering access to small loans (perhaps by acting as a part-guarantor) would 
be invaluable in relaxing resource constraints for people with disabilities in India. Furthermore, 
better mechanisms for increasing service outreach to smaller administrative units (districts and 
Panchayati Raj institutions) within a state may also bring tangible benefits that have a significant 
impact on the lives of people with disabilities, and women with disabilities in particular.  22 
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Figure 1: State-wise percent of households with disabled member(s). 
 
















Percent of households with person(s) with disabilities25 
 
Figure 2: State-wise percent of households with disabled male(s), disabled female(s), or multiple disabled member(s). 
 
Notes: Author’s calculations. Estimates weighted to national level with weights provided by NSSO (2002). 
 








Percent of households with person with disabilities who is male: comparison group is households with no disabled members
Percent of households with person with disabilities who is female: comparison group is household with no disabled members
Percent of households with more than one person with disabilities: comparison groups is households with one disabled member26 
 
Figure 3: State-wise average monthly per capita expenditure in households with and without disabled member(s). 
 
Notes: Author’s calculations. Estimates weighted to national level with weights provided by NSSO (2002). 
 












Average monthly per capita expenditure in HHs with person(s) with disabilities
Average monthly per capita expenditure in HHs with no person(s) with disabilities27 
 
Figure 4: State-wise percent of households with disabled member(s) that receive government aid. 
 
Notes: Author’s calculations. Estimates weighted to national level with weights provided by NSSO (2002). 
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Table 1: Summary statistics of outcomes at household level. 
State   person  monthly  disability  person is  person is  person has  person has  disabled  disabled  disabled  disabled  disabled 
   is married  per capita  caused loss  illiterate  middle   secondary  diploma or  person did   pers. rec.  pers. rec.  child att.   child en.  
     expend.  of work    schooled  sch. & above  cert. course  voc. course  govt. aid  n-govt. aid  pre-s. int.  in sp. sc. 
Jammu & Kash.  0.449  1055.962  0.540  0.388  0.376  0.226  0.010  0.009  0.042  0.000  0.014  0.020 
Himachal Prad.  0.499  1073.794  0.568  0.288  0.414  0.277  0.021  0.057  0.095  0.023  0.188  0.100 
Punjab  0.472  1147.634  0.556  0.364  0.375  0.252  0.009  0.015  0.050  0.006  0.000  0.052 
Chandigarh  0.529  1485.620  0.667  0.283  0.464  0.243  0.010  0.045  0.227  0.000  0.333  0.500 
Uttaranchal  0.440  975.320  0.405  0.330  0.413  0.249  0.007  0.010  0.010  0.021  0.083  0.053 
Haryana  0.459  1004.986  0.675  0.348  0.406  0.235  0.011  0.006  0.145  0.004  0.085  0.146 
New Delhi  0.480  1594.812  0.462  0.179  0.410  0.384  0.027  0.015  0.029  0.015  0.167  0.263 
Rajasthan  0.489  840.773  0.667  0.468  0.373  0.151  0.007  0.012  0.082  0.011  0.080  0.044 
Uttar Pradesh  0.453  754.425  0.627  0.481  0.352  0.162  0.005  0.012  0.040  0.008  0.067  0.025 
Bihar  0.474  546.208  0.553  0.552  0.305  0.141  0.002  0.005  0.028  0.007  0.023  0.018 
Sikkim  0.418  907.517  0.304  0.259  0.569  0.166  0.006  0.000  0.056  0.000  0.333  0.231 
Arunachal Prad.  0.451  997.251  0.152  0.363  0.405  0.219  0.013  0.000  0.042  0.042  0.118  0.000 
Nagaland  0.409  1264.426  0.300  0.138  0.647  0.206  0.008  0.021  0.034  0.021  0.019  0.000 
Manipur  0.416  819.553  0.358  0.277  0.434  0.278  0.011  0.023  0.027  0.004  0.194  0.097 
Mizoram  0.383  1459.716  0.277  0.104  0.598  0.290  0.007  0.025  0.148  0.027  0.074  0.048 
Tripura  0.470  888.994  0.406  0.231  0.571  0.195  0.003  0.038  0.031  0.010  0.161  0.102 
Meghalaya  0.398  961.552  0.302  0.204  0.591  0.192  0.012  0.018  0.035  0.000  0.075  0.040 
Assam  0.419  761.490  0.361  0.239  0.540  0.217  0.003  0.005  0.013  0.019  0.040  0.041 
West Bengal  0.494  892.346  0.465  0.291  0.497  0.206  0.005  0.018  0.040  0.020  0.094  0.088 
Jharkhand  0.467  685.523  0.529  0.426  0.380  0.185  0.009  0.011  0.036  0.012  0.080  0.013 
Orissa  0.471  597.170  0.565  0.406  0.423  0.162  0.009  0.003  0.070  0.000  0.111  0.012 
Chhattisgarh  0.464  656.989  0.552  0.410  0.421  0.158  0.011  0.008  0.096  0.006  0.047  0.029 
Madhya Prad.  0.471  715.831  0.637  0.419  0.415  0.160  0.006  0.015  0.145  0.001  0.041  0.022 
Gujarat  0.509  931.087  0.519  0.346  0.458  0.187  0.009  0.019  0.066  0.014  0.261  0.091 
Daman & Diu  0.438  1348.917  0.625  0.199  0.467  0.317  0.017  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.125 
Dadra & N. H.  0.518  1441.273  0.786  0.176  0.423  0.356  0.045  0.026  0.026  0.000  0.125  0.286 
Maharashtra  0.484  1098.449  0.609  0.287  0.454  0.247  0.011  0.018  0.082  0.018  0.243  0.265 
Andhra Pradesh  0.484  905.486  0.615  0.446  0.356  0.192  0.006  0.016  0.083  0.006  0.058  0.076 
Karnataka  0.455  954.509  0.541  0.321  0.404  0.258  0.017  0.008  0.258  0.005  0.134  0.066 
Goa  0.427  1063.292  0.222  0.312  0.413  0.272  0.003  0.036  0.000  0.000  0.750  0.333 
Lakshadweep  0.447  1184.885  0.429  0.168  0.614  0.192  0.026  0.000  0.013  0.000  0.250  0.000 
Kerala  0.477  1248.113  0.548  0.155  0.561  0.258  0.026  0.047  0.177  0.016  0.237  0.441 
Tamil Nadu  0.497  1104.969  0.486  0.278  0.435  0.267  0.020  0.014  0.084  0.027  0.163  0.152 
Pondicherry  0.467  1270.471  0.516  0.220  0.466  0.294  0.020  0.033  0.285  0.009  0.200  0.250 
Andaman & N.  0.452  1345.520  0.176  0.289  0.474  0.229  0.008  0.067  0.267  0.000  0.214  0.000 
Notes: Weighted to national level with weights provided by NSSO (2002). Table reports mean proportions in all columns except column (2), where 
monthly per capita expenditure is reported in 2002 Indian Rupees. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of household characteristics. 
State   rural  HH is  HH has wage/  HH religion  HH is  age of  head  head is  HH lives in  HH lives  Structure of HH 
   area  self-emp.  salary earn.  is Hindu  SC/ST   head  is male  illiterate  indep. house  in a flat  is not concrete 
Jammu & Kashmir  0.572  0.601  0.174  0.383  0.128  47.529  0.958  0.368  0.893  0.069  0.161 
Himachal Pradesh  0.833  0.542  0.113  0.950  0.321  49.733  0.796  0.298  0.810  0.177  0.042 
Punjab  0.493  0.427  0.340  0.466  0.356  45.985  0.909  0.388  0.849  0.112  0.063 
Chandigarh  0.286  0.411  0.366  0.813  0.214  37.634  0.982  0.196  0.482  0.295  0.045 
Uttaranchal  0.597  0.541  0.211  0.846  0.302  46.877  0.849  0.324  0.698  0.261  0.104 
Haryana  0.552  0.472  0.281  0.914  0.253  44.413  0.948  0.313  0.794  0.156  0.094 
New Delhi  0.054  0.325  0.575  0.836  0.176  40.735  0.925  0.141  0.489  0.340  0.037 
Rajasthan  0.620  0.573  0.184  0.875  0.300  43.739  0.910  0.430  0.818  0.085  0.179 
Uttar Pradesh  0.657  0.577  0.235  0.815  0.242  44.768  0.913  0.422  0.854  0.072  0.153 
Bihar  0.812  0.493  0.342  0.867  0.200  44.899  0.914  0.461  0.864  0.072  0.250 
Sikkim  0.778  0.458  0.177  0.729  0.243  42.785  0.920  0.233  0.622  0.347  0.108 
Arunachal Pradesh  0.686  0.521  0.179  0.279  0.721  41.407  0.905  0.383  0.833  0.007  0.542 
Nagaland  0.698  0.595  0.163  0.040  0.940  44.226  0.952  0.071  0.869  0.095  0.076 
Manipur  0.609  0.584  0.221  0.591  0.328  48.558  0.889  0.278  0.940  0.028  0.280 
Mizoram  0.321  0.438  0.375  0.038  0.975  45.105  0.864  0.020  0.804  0.183  0.112 
Tripura  0.722  0.447  0.195  0.910  0.443  45.575  0.905  0.200  0.931  0.017  0.222 
Meghalaya  0.667  0.529  0.260  0.208  0.797  43.820  0.844  0.159  0.964  0.034  0.198 
Assam  0.771  0.606  0.177  0.732  0.276  44.710  0.912  0.177  0.926  0.049  0.287 
West Bengal  0.567  0.464  0.347  0.771  0.297  45.881  0.905  0.262  0.729  0.144  0.129 
Jharkhand  0.629  0.499  0.254  0.844  0.344  43.623  0.911  0.371  0.877  0.079  0.138 
Orissa  0.739  0.459  0.301  0.944  0.378  45.036  0.887  0.362  0.864  0.056  0.305 
Chhattisgarh  0.677  0.442  0.381  0.952  0.385  44.784  0.905  0.363  0.923  0.044  0.020 
Madhya Pradesh  0.573  0.539  0.307  0.887  0.317  44.444  0.934  0.371  0.872  0.062  0.076 
Gujarat  0.469  0.435  0.351  0.883  0.263  44.461  0.922  0.301  0.815  0.073  0.063 
Daman & Diu  0.333  0.271  0.344  0.927  0.156  42.479  0.823  0.125  0.750  0.146  0.031 
Dadra & Nagar H.  0.500  0.240  0.427  0.917  0.427  38.313  0.969  0.156  0.583  0.208  0.031 
Maharashtra  0.410  0.372  0.433  0.781  0.231  44.917  0.895  0.239  0.489  0.122  0.049 
Andhra Pradesh  0.580  0.362  0.421  0.870  0.238  43.568  0.857  0.469  0.737  0.209  0.185 
Karnataka  0.485  0.394  0.375  0.837  0.216  45.427  0.851  0.345  0.822  0.083  0.065 
Goa  0.500  0.234  0.234  0.578  0.047  44.328  0.734  0.313  0.547  0.094  0.125 
Lakshadweep  0.500  0.297  0.328  0.125  0.953  44.156  0.578  0.188  0.938  0.016  0.016 
Kerala  0.599  0.363  0.216  0.608  0.131  51.647  0.756  0.138  0.931  0.034  0.112 
Tamil Nadu  0.390  0.336  0.402  0.862  0.202  46.255  0.849  0.260  0.682  0.208  0.137 
Pondicherry  0.231  0.313  0.370  0.837  0.125  47.178  0.841  0.216  0.582  0.346  0.192 
Andaman & Nic.  0.540  0.252  0.424  0.633  0.094  45.662  0.892  0.309  0.432  0.396  0.187 
Notes: Weighted to national level with weights provided by NSSO (2002). Table reports mean proportions in all columns except (6), which reports mean age in years.  30 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics of characteristics of people with disabilities at the household level. 
State  HH has  HH has  HH has  HH has more than  Person had disability  Age of onset   Parents   Disabled mem. 
  disabled mem.  disabled male(s)  disabled fem(s)  one disabled mem.  from birth  of disability  blood rel.  can self-care 
Jammu & Kashmir  0.525  0.403  0.330  0.077  0.315  40.770  0.028  0.918 
Himachal Pradesh  0.400  0.306  0.226  0.135  0.296  41.832  0.006  0.956 
Punjab  0.409  0.293  0.241  0.084  0.392  43.494  0.057  0.934 
Chandigarh  0.196  0.135  0.091  0.045  0.500  26.955  0.000  0.964 
Uttaranchal  0.302  0.210  0.146  0.031  0.484  32.410  0.003  0.969 
Haryana  0.418  0.303  0.243  0.079  0.450  37.721  0.002  0.948 
New Delhi  0.114  0.075  0.055  0.103  0.512  26.490  0.005  0.970 
Rajasthan  0.389  0.282  0.218  0.085  0.409  39.034  0.007  0.929 
Uttar Pradesh  0.479  0.358  0.290  0.081  0.351  36.108  0.025  0.928 
Bihar  0.525  0.415  0.308  0.073  0.453  32.259  0.036  0.908 
Sikkim  0.438  0.305  0.280  0.063  0.512  39.992  0.003  0.972 
Arunachal Pradesh  0.229  0.141  0.124  0.042  0.438  35.396  0.138  0.971 
Nagaland  0.579  0.436  0.376  0.000  0.349  28.279  0.190  0.976 
Manipur  0.435  0.313  0.251  0.046  0.291  40.750  0.020  0.947 
Mizoram  0.408  0.247  0.276  0.060  0.482  35.234  0.047  0.974 
Tripura  0.363  0.251  0.200  0.038  0.395  33.022  0.028  0.953 
Meghalaya  0.424  0.294  0.258  0.067  0.326  30.477  0.013  0.974 
Assam  0.470  0.348  0.272  0.038  0.356  32.860  0.028  0.953 
West Bengal  0.546  0.441  0.327  0.084  0.367  35.897  0.018  0.939 
Jharkhand  0.406  0.296  0.220  0.063  0.497  28.867  0.048  0.929 
Orissa  0.577  0.457  0.374  0.069  0.295  40.931  0.030  0.954 
Chhattisgarh  0.484  0.360  0.293  0.058  0.356  35.051  0.022  0.941 
Madhya Pradesh  0.403  0.300  0.228  0.100  0.412  35.183  0.039  0.926 
Gujarat  0.482  0.362  0.294  0.082  0.377  38.386  0.033  0.915 
Daman & Diu  0.313  0.224  0.165  0.067  0.433  34.824  0.000  1.000 
Dadra & Nagar H.  0.396  0.284  0.227  0.053  0.401  39.576  0.000  0.890 
Maharashtra  0.456  0.343  0.270  0.100  0.370  41.143  0.090  0.929 
Andhra Pradesh  0.497  0.361  0.321  0.070  0.385  40.030  0.162  0.936 
Karnataka  0.424  0.299  0.258  0.078  0.400  40.772  0.112  0.931 
Goa  0.438  0.294  0.280  0.036  0.429  46.698  0.031  0.906 
Lakshadweep  0.594  0.458  0.422  0.105  0.511  41.881  0.102  0.969 
Kerala  0.638  0.501  0.466  0.093  0.324  42.050  0.039  0.921 
Tamil Nadu  0.529  0.405  0.337  0.080  0.336  42.519  0.185  0.926 
Pondicherry  0.514  0.357  0.357  0.075  0.324  39.797  0.101  0.957 
Andaman & Nic.  0.432  0.313  0.269  0.100  0.458  36.059  0.086  0.963 
Notes: Weighted to national level with weights provided by NSSO. Table reports mean proportions in cols. (1) – (5), (7) – (8). Mean age in years in column (6). 31 
 
Table 4: Random-coefficients regressions of household outcomes: comparison of households with disabled member(s) and households without 
disabled member(s). 
  Outcomes 
   person  monthly per  person is  person is  person has  person has 
   is married  capita  illiterate  middle   secondary school  diploma or certificate 
     expenditure    schooled  & above   course 







  (0.004)  (18.005)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.001) 
             
Test of parameter constancy             
   value  1388.44  3740.57  3712.50  2317.83  1838.33  848.47 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
             
Includes household characteristics  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
HH Observations  32601  32603  32596  32596  32596  32596 
Number of States   35  35  35  35  35  35 
Notes: Weighted to national level with weights provided by NSSO (2002). Comparison group is households without disabled member(s). Table 
reports state-level random-coefficient regression estimates. Bootstrapped standard errors, clustered by state, in parentheses. p-values in square 
brackets. Household characteristics included are rural status, whether the household is self-employed, whether it has wage/salary earning, whether the 
religion of the household is Hinduism, whether the household belongs to SC/ST groups, age, gender, and literacy status of the household head, and 
indicators of household structure. The notation 
*** is p<0.01, 
** is p<0.05, 
* is p<0.10. Regressions include a constant term.  
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Table 5: Random-coefficients regressions of household outcomes: comparison of households with disabled male(s) and households without disabled 
member(s). 
  Outcomes 
   person  monthly per  person is  person is  person has  person has 
   is married  capita  illiterate  middle   secondary school  diploma or certificate 
     expenditure    schooled  & above   course 
Household has disabled male  -0.048
***  -190.939




  (0.005)  (17.164)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.001) 
             
Test of parameter constancy             
   value  1154.12  3075.37  2942.18  1841.58  1523.50  756.18 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
             
Includes household characteristics  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
HH Observations  26669  26671  26666  26666  26666  26666 
Number of States  35  35  35  35  35  35 
Notes: Weighted to national level with weights provided by NSSO (2002). Comparison group is households without disabled member(s). Table 
reports state-level random-coefficient regression estimates. Bootstrapped standard errors, clustered by state, in parentheses. p-values in square 
brackets. Household characteristics included are rural status, whether the household is self-employed, whether it has wage/salary earning, whether the 
religion of the household is Hinduism, whether the household belongs to SC/ST groups, age, gender, and literacy status of the household head, and 
indicators of household structure. The notation 
*** is p<0.01, 
** is p<0.05, 
* is p<0.10. Regressions include a constant term.  
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Table 6: Random-coefficients regressions of household outcomes: comparison of households with disabled female(s) and households without 
disabled member(s). 
  Outcomes 
   person  monthly per  person is  person is  person has  person has 
   is married  capita  illiterate  middle   secondary school  diploma or certificate 
     expenditure    schooled  & above   course 







  (0.005)  (16.546)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.001) 
             
Test of parameter constancy             
   value  1007.10  2668.57  2670.62  1599.25  1301.65  667.95 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
             
Includes household characteristics  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
HH Observations  24190  24192  24186  24186  24186  24186 
Number of States  35  35  35  35  35  35 
Notes: Weighted to national level with weights provided by NSSO (2002). Comparison group is households without disabled member(s). Table 
reports state-level random-coefficient regression estimates. Bootstrapped standard errors, clustered by state, in parentheses. p-values in square 
brackets. Household characteristics included are rural status, whether the household is self-employed, whether it has wage/salary earning, whether the 
religion of the household is Hinduism, whether the household belongs to SC/ST groups, age, gender, and literacy status of the household head, and 
indicators of household structure. The notation 
*** is p<0.01, 
** is p<0.05, 
* is p<0.10. Regressions include a constant term.  
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Table 7: Random-coefficients regressions of household outcomes: comparison of households with only disabled female(s) and households with only 
disabled male(s). 
  Outcomes 
   person  monthly pc  disability  person is  person is  person has  person has  dis. person  dis. person  dis. person  dis. child  dis. child 
   is married  expenditure  caused loss  illiterate  middle   sec. sch.  diploma or  did voc.  rec. govt.  received  attended  enroll. in  
       of work    schooled  & above  cert. course  course  aid  non-govt  pre-sch  special 
                     aid  interven.  school 





***  -0.001  -0.0003  -0.001  -0.005  -0.003
**  0.018  -0.013 
disabled female  (0.004)  (17.101)  (0.018)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.015)  (0.019) 
                         
Test of parameter                         
constancy                         
   value  655.30  1938.32  505.82  2070.93  1455.08  791.34  547.97  323.23  870.44  281.39  325.09  88.52 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.239]  [0.000]  [0.840]  [0.000]  [0.583] 
                         
Includes HH   YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
characteristics                         
HH Observations  15191  15191  5722  15188  15188  15188  15188  15181  15182  15182  3331  659 
Number of states  35  35  31  35  35  35  35  35  35  35  35  24 
Notes: Weighted to national level with weights provided by NSSO (2002). Comparison group is households with only disabled male. Table reports 
state-level random-coefficient regression estimates. Bootstrapped standard errors, clustered by state, in parentheses. p-values in square brackets. 
Household characteristics included are rural status, whether the household is self-employed, whether it has wage/salary earning, whether the religion 
of the household is Hinduism, whether the household belongs to SC/ST groups, age and literacy status of the household head, and indicators of 
whether the individual was disabled from birth and age of onset of disability for individuals who were not born disabled. The notation 
*** is p<0.01, 
** 
is p<0.05, 
* is p<0.10. Regressions include a constant term.  
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Table 8: Random-coefficients regressions of household outcomes: comparison of households with more than one person with disabilities and 
households with only one disabled person. 
   Outcomes 
   person  monthly pc  person is  person is  person has  person has  dis. person  dis. person  dis. person 
   is married  expenditure  illiterate  middle   sec. sch.  diploma or  did voc.  rec. govt.  received 
         schooled  & above  cert. course  course  aid  non-govt aid 
Household has   0.005  -31.536  -0.007  0.024
**  -0.010  0.00003  0.006  0.004  0.001 
more than one  (0.016)  (22.816)  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.002) 
member with 
disabilities                    
                   
Test of parameter                   
constancy                   
   value  589.61  1729.99  1957.40  1351.65  755.49  546.08  326.14  859.66  258.76 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.118]  [0.000]  [0.947] 
                   
Includes HH   YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
characteristics                   
HH Observations  15045  15045  15042  15042  15042  15042  15035  15036  15036 
Number of States  34  34  34  34  34  34  34  34  34 
Notes: Weighted to national level with weights provided by NSSO (2002). Comparison group is households with a disabled member. Cannot 
estimate models for disability caused loss of work, disabled child attended pre-school intervention, and disabled child enrolled in special school due 
to insufficient variation. The state of Nagaland was also excluded due to insufficient variation. Table reports state-level random-coefficient regression 
estimates. Bootstrapped standard errors, clustered by state, in parentheses. p-values in square brackets. Household characteristics included are rural 
status, whether the household is self-employed, whether it has wage/salary earning, whether the religion of the household is Hinduism, whether the 
household belongs to SC/ST groups, age and literacy status of the household head, and an indicator of whether the individual was disabled from 
birth. The notation 
*** is p<0.01, 
** is p<0.05, 
* is p<0.10. Regressions include a constant term.  
 36 
 
Table 9: Instrumental variables regressions of household outcomes: comparison of households with disabled member(s) and households without 
disabled member(s). 
  Outcomes 
   person  monthly per  person is  person is  person has  person has 
   is married  capita  illiterate  middle   secondary school  diploma or certificate 
     expenditure    schooled  & above   course 
Household has disabled member(s)  -0.056
***  -227.062




  (0.006)  (39.051)  (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.002) 
             
Under-identification test             
Kleibergen - Paap LM statistic  16.841  16.840  16.842  16.842  16.842  16.842 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Over-identification test             
Hansen J statistic  0.065  0.150  0.881  0.925  0.081  1.146 
  [0.799]  [0.699]  [0.348]  [0.336]  [0.776]  [0.284] 
             
Includes household characteristics  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
HH Observations  32601  32603  32596  32596  32596  32596 
Number of States   35  35  35  35  35  35 
Notes: Weighted to national level with weights provided by NSSO (2002). Comparison group is households without disabled member(s). Table 
reports two-stage least squares models. Standard errors, clustered by state, in parentheses. p-values in square brackets. Household characteristics 
included are rural status, whether the household is self-employed, whether it has wage/salary earning, whether the religion of the household is 
Hinduism, whether the household belongs to SC/ST groups, age, gender, and literacy status of the household head, indicators of household structure, 
and regional indicators for northern, western, eastern, and central states. A test for the equivalence of the regional indicators is rejected for all 
outcomes except the last one – person has diploma or certificate course (these results are not reported but are available on request). The notation 
*** is 
p<0.01, 
** is p<0.05, 
* is p<0.10. Regressions include a constant term.  
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Table 10: Wald estimator results for household outcomes: comparison of households with disabled member(s) and households without disabled 
member(s). 
  Outcomes 
   person  monthly per  person is  person is  person has  person has 
   is married  capita  illiterate  middle   secondary school  diploma or certificate 
     expenditure    schooled  & above   course 
Household has disabled member(s)  -0.037
***  -205.272




  (0.004)  (18.776)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.001) 
             
Under-identification test             
Kleibergen - Paap LM statistic  18.283  18.281  18.283  18.283  18.283  18.283 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Weak identification test             
Kleibergen – Paap F statistic  1541.833  1541.550  1541.463  1541.463  1541.463  1541.463 
10% maximal IV size  16.380  16.380  16.380  16.380  16.380  16.380 
             
Includes household characteristics  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
HH Observations  32601  32603  32596  32596  32596  32596 
Number of States   35  35  35  35  35  35 
Notes: Weighted to national level with weights provided by NSSO (2002). Comparison group is households without disabled member(s). Standard 
errors, clustered by state, in parentheses. p-values in square brackets. Household characteristics included are rural status, whether the household is 
self-employed, whether it has wage/salary earning, whether the religion of the household is Hinduism, whether the household belongs to SC/ST 
groups, age, gender, and literacy status of the household head, indicators of household structure, and regional indicators for northern, western, 
eastern, and central states. A test for the equivalence of the regional indicators is rejected for all outcomes except the last one – person has diploma or 
certificate course (these results are not reported but are available on request). The notation 
*** is p<0.01, 
** is p<0.05, 
* is p<0.10. Regressions include 
a constant term.  
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Table 11: Robustness of the Wald estimator results: Tests of whether instrument is correlated with personal characteristics that are independent of 
disability status. 
   Personal characteristics 
   HH religion  HH belongs  HH belongs to  Gender is male 
  is Hinduism  to Scheduled Caste  Other Backward   
     or Scheduled Tribe  Classes   
Whether parents of disabled  -0.009  0.038  0.020  -0.001 
member were blood-related  (0.013)  (0.024)  (0.016)  (0.007) 
         
         
Includes household characteristics  YES  YES  YES  YES 
HH Observations  32603  6103  6103  6103 
Number of States   35  35  35  35 
Notes: Weighted to national level with weights provided by NSSO (2002). Comparison group is households without disabled member(s). Table 
reports OLS regressions. Standard errors, clustered by state, in parentheses. Household characteristics included are rural status, whether the 
household is self-employed, whether it has wage/salary earning, age, gender, and literacy status of the household head, indicators of household 
structure, and regional indicators for northern, western, eastern, and central states. The notation 
*** is p<0.01, 
** is p<0.05, 
* is p<0.10. Regressions 
include a constant term.  
 